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What is project finance?  
Abstract 
Project finance is the process of financing a specific economic unit that the sponsors create, in which creditors share 
much of the venture’s business risk and funding is obtained strictly for the project itself. Project finance creates value 
by reducing the costs of funding, maintaining the sponsors financial flexibility, increasing the leverage ratios, avoiding 
contamination risk, reducing corporate taxes, improving risk management, and reducing the costs associated with 
market imperfections. However, project finance transactions are complex undertakings, they have higher costs of 
borrowing when compared to conventional financing and the negotiation of the financing and operating agreements is 
time-consuming. In addition to describing the economic motivation for the use of project finance, this paper povides 
details on project finance characteristics and players, presents the recent trends of the project finance market and 
provides some statistics in relation to project finance lending activity between 2000 and 2014. Statistical analysis 
shows that project finance loans arranged for U.S. borrowers have higher credit spreads and upfront fees, and have 
higher loan size to deal size ratios when compared with loans arranged for borrowers located in W.E. On the contrary, 
loans closed in the U.S. have a much shorter average maturity and are much less likely to be subject to currency risk 
and to be closed as term loans. 
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Introduction© 
Typically used for funding public and private 
capital-intensive facilities and utilities, project 
finance (PF) is an economically significant growing 
financial market segment, but still largely 
understudied. Esty and Sesia (2007) repo t that a 
record $57.8 billion in PF funding was arranged in 
Western Europe (W.E.) in 2006, which compares 
with $35.0 billion invested in the United States 
(U.S.) – record $328 billion in PF funding was 
globally arranged in 2006, a 51.2% increase from 
the $217 billion reported for 2001. In 2014, $54.1 
billion and $60.2 billion were arranged in W.E. and 
the U.S., respectively – $260 billion was arranged 
worldwide during 2014. According to Thomson 
Reuters, in comparison with other financing 
mechanisms in W.E., as well as in the U.S., the PF 
market was smaller than both the corporate bond 
and the asset securitization markets in 2014. 
However, the amount invested in PF was larger than 
the amounts raised through IPOs or venture capital 
funds, which indicates that the financial crisis has 
had a small impact on the financing of large 
infrastructures and still represents a promising 
segment of global lending activity. 
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Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001) present PF as the process 
of financing ‘a particular economic unit in whic  a 
lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows 
and earnings of that economic unit as the source of 
funds from which a loan will be repaid and to the 
assets of the economic unit as collateral for the 
loan’. Thus, the funding does not depend on the 
reliability and creditworthiness of the sponsors and 
does not even depend on the value of assets that 
sponsors make available to financiers. In this line of 
reasoning, Gatti (2008) refers to PF as ‘the 
structured financing of a specific economic unit that 
the sponsors create by means of share capital, and 
for which the financier considers cash flows as the 
source of loan reimbursement, whereas project 
assets only represent collateral’. 
Considering that debt repayment comes from the 
project only rather than from any other entity –
nonrecourse debt1 –, Esty (2004b) defines PF as a 
transaction that ‘involves the creation of a legally 
independent project company financed with equity 
from one or more sponsoring firms and onrecourse 
debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset’. 
Esty focuses on the following three key decisions 
related to the use of PF: (i) investment decision – 
involving industrial assets; (ii ) organizational 
decision – creation of a legally independent company 
to own the assets (off-balance sheet form of 
financing); and (iii ) financing decision – nonrecourse 
debt. This definition distinguishes PF from other 
structured financing vehicles like securitization, 
leveraged acquisitions, and structured leasing. 
1 At the other extreme, in conventional corporate financing, lenders rely 
on the overall creditworthiness of the enterprise financing a new project 
to provide them security. 
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Over the last 35 years, PF has been an important 
source of funding for public and private ventures 
around the world. It is most commonly used for 
capital-intensive facilities and utilities such as 
power plants, refineries, toll roads, pipelines, 
telecommunications facilities, and industrial plants 
with relatively transparent cash flows, in riskier 
than average countries, using relatively long-term 
financing. Definitions of PF emphasize the idea that 
lenders have no claim to any other assets than the 
project itself. Therefore, lenders must be completely 
certain that the project is fully capable of meeting its 
debt and equity liabilities through its economic merit 
alone. The success of a PF transaction is highly 
associated with structuring the financing of a project 
through as little recourse as possible to the sponsor, 
while at the same time providing sufficient credit 
support through guarantees or undertakings of a 
sponsor or third party so that lenders will be satisfied 
with the credit risk2. Finally, the allocation of specific 
project risks to those parties best able to manage them 
is one of the key comparative advantages of PF. 
Using a global sample of 5,935 PF deals (10,950 PF 
loans) closed in the 2000-2014 period, we show that 
PF has not significantly contracted during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis. In 2014, a record $259.9 
billion in PF funding was globally arranged, a 
278.5% increase from $68.7 billion reported for 2000. 
PF lending is concentrated in five key industries – 
utilities, construction, manufacturing, mining and 
transportation account for 77.3% of all PF lending. 
We also show that there are considerable differences 
between the countries, which attract PF lending. The 
biggest recipients of PF lending are Western Europe 
and Eastern Asia, whereas only 10.4% of PF lending 
goes to U.S. borrowers. 
Statistical results show that most of the common 
contractual characteristics of PF loans differ 
significantly between deals extended to U.S. vis-à-
vis W.E. borrowers, with the exception of deal size 
and loans extended to financial institutions. Our 
results show important univariate differences, 
namely: (i) PF loans’ average credit spreads are 
significantly higher for deals closed in the U.S. than 
those closed in W.E.; (ii ) loans arranged for U.S  
borrowers have a significantly larger average 
tranche size than  loans extended to W.E. 
borrowers; (iii ) deals in W.E. benefit more from 
tranching – they have a higher number of tranches 
and, thus, lower loan size to deal size ratios than 
deals in the U.S.; (iv) loans extended to W.E. 
borrowers have much longer average maturity than 
2 See Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Caselli and Gatti (2005) for a 
description of the key elements of a successful project financing 
transaction. 
those arranged for U.S. borrowers; and (v) PF loans 
in the U.S. are much less likely to be subject to 
currency risk and to be closed as term loans, and are 
more likely to be closed as fixed rate loans rather 
than floating rate loans. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Sections 1 and 2 describe the typical PF transaction 
scheme and the main economic motivations and 
problems of PF, respectively. The recent trends in 
project financing are presented in section 3. Section 
4 presents the contractual characteristics of PF loans 
and compares loans arranged for U.S. borrowers 
with those extended to borrowers located in W.E. 
The final section presents the main conclusion. 
1. Project finance: characteristics and players 
There are five distinctive features of a PF 
transaction. First, the debtor is a project company 
(special purpose vehicle – SPV) that is financially 
and legally independent from the sponsors, i.e., 
project companies are standalone entities. Second, 
financiers have only limited or no recourse to the 
sponsors – the extent, amount and quality of their 
involvement is limited. Third, project risks are 
allocated to those parties that are best able to 
manage them. Fourth, the cash flow generated by 
the project must be sufficient to cover operating 
cash flows and service the debt in terms of interest 
and debt repayment. Finally, collateral is given by 
sponsors to financiers as security for cash inflows 
and assets tied up in managing the project. 
Commonly referred as “off-balance-sheet” 
financing, PF is often used to segregate the credit 
risk of the project from that of its sponsors so that 
l nders, investors, and other parties will appraise the 
project strictly on its own merits. It involves the 
creation of an entirely new vehicle company, with a 
limited life, for each new investment project. Project 
companies are legally independent entities with very 
concentrated equity ownership and have higher 
leverage levels. Esty (2004b) shows that project 
companies’ average book value debt-to- otal 
capitalization ratio is 70%, which is two to three times 
higher than the average leverage ratio of a typical 
publicly traded company, and are funded through a 
series of legal contracts. This idea is corroborated by 
Esty (2003), who describes PF as a form of financing 
based on a standalone entity (project company), with 
highly levered capital structures, concentrated equity 
ownership and concentrated debt ownership3.  
The core of PF is the analysis of project risks, 
namely construction risk, operating risk, market 
risk, regulatory risk, insurance risk, and currency 
3 A typical PF transaction only has a few shareholders (three of four), 
compared to hundreds or thousands of shareholders in public 
companies. 
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risk. Gatti (2008) identifies risks related to the pre-
completion phase – activity planning risk, 
technological risk, and construction risk or 
completion risk; risks related to the post-completion 
phase – supply risk, operating risk, and demand 
risk; and risks related to both phases – interest rate 
risk, exchange risk, inflation risk, environmental 
risk, regulatory risk, political risk, country risk, 
legal risk, and credit risk or counterparty risk. These 
risks are allocated contractually to the parties best 
able to manage them. The process of risk 
management is usually based on the following 
interrelated steps: (i) risk identification; (ii ) risk 
analysis; (iii ) risk transfer and allocation; and (iv) 
residual risk management. This process is crucial in 
PF transactions and they must be identified and 
allocated to create an efficient incentivizing tool for 
the parties involved. PF can, thus, be seen as a 
system for distributing risk among the parties 
involved in a venture, i.e., the effective 
identification and allocation of risks allows the 
minimization of cash flows’ volatility generated by 
the project. 
Corielli et al. (2010) argue that one of the key 
characteristics of PF transactions is the existence of a 
network of nonfinancial contracts (NFCs), organized 
by the SPV with third parties, often involving the 
sponsoring firms as well, i.e., a PF transaction can be 
viewed as a nexus of contracts between the players 
involved in such a deal4. Figure 1 presents a graphic 
representation of a typical contractual framework in 
project financing. Of the numerous contracts four are 
particularly important, these are: (i) construction 
contracts and engineering, procurement, and 
construction (EPC) closed on a turnkey basis; (ii ) 
purchasing agreements to guarantee raw materials to 
the SPV at predefined quantities, quality, and prices; 
(iii ) selling agreements enable the SPV to sell part or 
all of its output to a third party that commits to buy 
unconditionally at predefined prices and for a given 
period of time; and (iv) operation and maintenance 
agreements compliant with predefined service-l vel 
agreements. This contractual bundle is, then, 
presented to creditors to secure debt financing, 
serving as the basis for negotiating the quantity and 
the cost of external funding. 
 
Fig. 1. Typical structure of a project finance deal 
From Figure 1, it is also possible to identify the 
following key players in PF: (i) the project sponsors 
– a controlling stake in the equity of the separate 
company established for the purpose of undertaking 
the project will typically be owned4by a single 
4 PF is commonly referred to as ‘contractual finance’: the project 
company signs contracts with construction firms, suppliers, customers, 
host governments, and lenders. As explained by Esty and Megginson 
(2003), ‘[T]his nexus of contracts, to use Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
characterization of the firm, is intended to ensure loan repayment when 
the project is solvent and loan recoverability when the project is in 
default’. 
project sponsor, or by a group of sponsors5; (ii ) the 
host government, and often state-owned enterprises 
– the project company will in most cases need to 
obtain a concession from the host government6; (iii ) 
5 There are four types of sponsors that are often involved in PF transactions 
and invest in the SPV: (1) industrial sponsors – ee PF as an initiative linked 
to their core business; (2) public sponsors – government or other public 
bodies whose aims center on social welfare; (3) contract sponsors – they 
develop, build and run the projects and provide equity and/or subordinated 
debt to the SPV; and (4) purely financial sponsors – they invest capital with 
the aim of gathering high returns (e.g., commercial banks, multilateral 
development banks, and private equity funds). 
6 Additionally, sometimes the host government needs to establish a new 
regulatory framework or provide environmental permits. 
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the constructing and engineering firms; (iv) the 
legal specialists; (v) the accounting, financial, and 
risk assessment professionals; (vi) the lead 
arranging banks7; (vii) the participating banks; and 
(viii ) the suppliers and customers. A single 
participant in a PF deal can take on a number of 
roles, e.g., a contractor can be sponsor, builder, and 
operator at the same time; banks can be sponsors 
and lenders simultaneously. However, not all the 
organizations shown in Figure 1 are necessarily 
involved. For example, a deal with exclusively 
private actors would not include sponsors belonging 
to the public sector. Finally, a structure in which 
financing is provided directly to the SPV is 
presented. However, financing may also be 
structured through leasing vehicles or with a bond 
offer to the financial market. 
PF projects are funded with small amounts of 
private equity contributions and much larger 
amounts of nonrecourse syndicated loans, which are 
the principal external financing type. Esty and 
Megginson (2003) find that debt ownership is 
highly and significantly more concentrated than 
equity ownership and debt ownership concentration 
is positively related to the strength of creditor rights 
and the reliability of legal enforcement. Thus, 
equity and bank debt are the principal financing 
instruments in a PF transaction. The SPV’s 
shareholders are expected to provide a certain 
amount of equity capital in order to demonstrate 
their commitment to the project. Debt funding can 
consist of either bank debt – this has been the 
common means of financing – or financing from 
bond issues or a combination of both. Bank debt 
tends to be more expensive than bonds with higher 
rates and shorter loan duration. However, once a 
project has completed the development phase 
including construction, the risk profile alters and the 
SPV can obtain better refinancing terms and lower 
rates for the rest of its projected life. 
Large-scale projects require substantial investments 
up-front and only start to generate cash inflows after 
a relatively long construction period. Thus, PF debt 
is characterized by much longer maturities 
compared to other forms of financing. In terms of 
the cost of funding, Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) assert that PF loans have lower spreads than 
do most comparable non-PF loans. The absence of a 
clear relationship between spreads and maturity in 
PF seemed to be a particular puzzle. Sorge and 
7 Lead arrangers perform the due diligence on the vehicle company and 
the project itself to ensure that all potential adverse information is 
revealed before loan syndication; design an optimal loan syndicate that 
will deter strategic defaults but allow for efficient negotiation in the 
event of liquidity defaults; and spearhead monitoring of the borrower 
after the loan closes and discourage the sponsor from strategically 
defaulting or otherwise expropriating project cash flows. 
Gadanecz (2008) argue that whereas spreads for 
both investment and speculative-grade loans other 
than PF are a positive linear function of maturity, 
PF loans have a ‘hump-shaped’ or non-linear term 
structure. This occurs because: (i) as PF loans tend 
to have short-erm liquidity constrains, lenders grant 
longer maturities to avoid increasing the projects’ 
probability of default; and (ii ) projects go through 
fairly predictable risk phases that are gradually 
resolved, with spreads first increasing and, then, 
falling over time. 
2. Advantages and disadvantages of project 
financing  
To understand the motivation for using PF, a 
thorough understanding is needed of why the 
combination of a firm plus a project might be worth 
more when financed separately with nonrecourse 
debt project financing than when they are financed 
jointly with corporate funds – corporate financing. 
Brealey et al. (1996) argue that PF creates value by 
resolving agency problems and improving risk 
management. Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b) takes a 
more general view of the problem and presents four 
primary reasons for using PF. Firstly, PF can be 
used to mitigate costly agency conflicts – agency 
cost motivation – inside project companies and 
among capital providers. PF highly levered capital 
structures play an important disciplinary role, 
because they prevent managers from wasting free 
cash flow, and deter related parties from trying to 
appropriate it. Secondly, this type of transaction 
allows companies with little spare debt capacity to 
avoid the opportunity cost of underinvestment in 
positive NPV projects – debt overhang motivation. 
According to Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), Gatti 
(2008), and Fabozzi et al. (2006), the off-balance 
sheet treatment of the funding raised by the SPV is 
crucial for sponsors, since it only has limited impact 
on sponsors’ creditworthiness, and does not impact 
sponsors’ ability to access additional financing in 
the future. Thirdly, PF improves risk management – 
risk management motivation. The nonrecourse 
nature of project debt protects the sponsoring firm 
from risk contamination. Additionally, PF creates 
value by improving risk management inside the 
project. Risks are allocated with the goals of 
reducing cost and ensuring proper benefits. PF can 
also help to reduce underinvestment due to 
asymmetric information problems – asymmetric 
information motivation. The separation of projects 
from the sponsoring firm or firms facilitates initial 
credit decisions and it is relatively easy to convey 
information that would be more difficult in a 
corporate financing framework, in which the joint 
evaluation of the project and existing assets can be 
more problematic. 
203 
                                                     
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 1, 2017 
Bearing the aforementioned arguments in mind, 
several authors (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2003, 
2004a; Corielli et al., 2010) argue that PF 
transactions lower the cost of funding by mitigating 
agency costs, reducing information asymmetries, 
and improving risk management (Pinto and Alves, 
2016). Empirically, Gatti et al. (2013) corroborate 
this idea by showing that certification in PF can 
create economic value by reducing loan spreads. 
Additionally, Esty (2003) also points out the 
reduction of corporate taxes, namely tax rate 
reductions and tax holidays, and high leverage 
increments interest tax shields, as another important 
economic benefit. Pinto and Alves (2016) show that 
borrowers choose PF when they seek long-term 
financing and funding cost reduction. 
Despite the referred advantages, it is possible to 
identify in the extant literature (e.g., Esty, 2004a,b; 
Fabozzi et al., 2006; Gatti, 2008; Bonetti et al., 
2010) the following main problems related to the 
use of PF: (i) complexity in terms of designing the 
transaction and writing the required documentation; 
(ii ) higher costs of borrowing when compared to 
conventional financing; and (iii ) the negotiation of 
the financing and operating agreements is time-
consuming. As pointed out by Esty (2004a), a PF 
transaction is expensive to set up, it takes a long 
time to execute, and it is highly restrictive once in 
place. Similarly, Gatti (2008) confirms that the 
principal drawback of PF is that structuring such a 
deal is more costly than the corporate financing 
option. Although these are counter-intuitive features 
of project finance when compared to corporate 
financing, Esty (2004b) and Bonetti et al. (2010) 
state that in practice, the additional costs are more 
than compensated for by the advantages that arise 
from the reduction in the net financing costs 
associated with large capital investments, off-
balance sheet financing, and appropriate risk 
allocation. 
3. Recent trends in project financing 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) point out that 
‘[ T]he use of project finance to fund natural 
resources, electric power, transportation, and other 
ventures around the world has risen steadily for the 
past four decades, from its modern beginnings 
financing development of the North Sea oil fields 
during the 1970s’. Data reported by Esty and Sesia 
(2007) indicate that, in the U.S., the PF market is 
smaller than the total value of corporate bond 
issues, but larger than the total value of funds raised 
through initial public offerings or venture capital 
funds – considering all global markets, PF bank 
loans and project bonds recorded 23% and 15% 
compound annual growth rates, respectively, from 
1994 to 2006. PF has not contracted significantly 
during the current financial crisis when compared to 
other forms of financing. Indeed, the total value of 
PF arranged worldwide hit a record of $320.9 
billion during 2008, and dropped only 9% to $292.5 
billion during 2009. In 2014, $260 billion were 
arranged worldwide8. This indicates that the 
financial crisis has had a small impact on the 
financing of large infrastructures and still represents 
a promising segment of global lending activity, 
mainly in Europe. 
According to Gatti (2005), the growth trend of PF 
transactions in the eighties and nineties moved 
along two lines: (i) expansion of PF in developed 
countries – promoters began to promote PF 
technique to developing country governments as a 
way to rapidly create basic infrastructure and ensure 
greater involvement of private capital, guaranteed 
by Export Credit Agencies in their own countries; 
and (ii ) development of PF in developed countries 
as a way to realize projects that had lower market 
risk coverage or projects in which the government 
intervened to promote the development of public 
works (public-private partnerships – PPPs). 
As far as financing is concerned, sponsors have 
been reverting to more structured deals as a way to 
shift market risk from companies back to the buyers 
of the project’s output. Additionally, sponsors can 
use various hybrid structures to mitigate risks, 
which are better suited for certain types of assets 
and have the potential to expand the boundaries of 
PF into new asset classes. PPPs are an example of a 
hybrid structure that has become more common. 
PPPs use private capital and private companies to 
construct and, then, operate project assets, such as 
roads, prisons, and schools, which historically have 
been financed with public resources and operated 
on a not-for-profit basis (Esty, 2004a). Through 
PPP structures, governments shift construction and 
operating risks to the private sector, which is 
usually more efficient in building and, then, running 
the asset9. In these partnerships, the role of public 
bodies is usually based on a concession agreement. 
Thus, a PPP is any medium-to-long term 
relationship between the public and private sectors, 
involving the sharing of risks and rewards of 
multisector skills, expertise and finance to deliver 
desired policy outcomes. 
In practice, various acronyms are used  for the 
different types of concession agreements, namely: 
8 Source: Thomson Reuters Global Project Finance Review. For further 
development, see section 4. 
9 Blanc-Brude and Strande (2007) define PPP as ‘an increasingly 
popular method of procurement of public infrastructure projects – one 
in which a public authority commissions the design, construction, 
operation, maintenance, and financing of a public infrastructure project 
from a private consortium within a single contractual framework’. 
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(i) BOT (build, operate, and transfer); (ii ) BOOT 
(build, own, operate, and transfer); and (iii ) BOO 
(build, operate, and own). In UK – the first country 
to launch a systematic program of such projects – 
PPPs are part of what is known as the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), which is a strategic 
economic policy to migrate public administration 
from owning assets and infrastructures to 
purchasing services from private parties n tead. A 
government that uses PF obtains both private-sector 
funding and private-sector management. PF thereby 
reduces the need for government borrowing, shifts 
part of the risks presented by the project to the 
private sector, and aims to achieve more eff ctive 
management of the project. According to Blanc-
Brude and Strange (2007), risk transfer is the 
central motivation for using PPP, by which the 
benefits of efficient risk management by private 
investors are expected to more than offset the cost 
of risk-pricing. Klompjan and Wouters (2002) state 
that one of the main advantages of a PPP for a 
government or a public entity is allowing a project 
to proceed without being a direct burden on the 
government’s budget. Despite all of the advantages 
connected to PPPs, there also are pivotal points of 
concern and criticism. For example, some critics 
argue that the cost of funding in a PPP is higher 
than the cost of public funds. In this regard, a 
distinction is commonly made among operators: PF 
initiatives, which are fully self-financed PF in the 
strict sense, in which the assessment is based on the 
soundness of the contractual framework and the 
counterparties versus those that are partially self-
financed – the bankability depends considerably on 
the level of public grants conferred. 
Another important influence on the future of PF is 
the impact of bank regulation. According to Basel II 
and Basel III accords, PF loans have higher default 
and loss rates than commercial loans and, therefore, 
deserve higher capital requirements. In its 
preliminary assessment, the Committee argues that 
project loans possess unique loss distribution and 
risk characteristics, including greater risk volatility 
than other types of bank loans, which could lead to 
both high default rates and hig loss rates (BIS, 
2001). Thus, spreads on low-rated PF loans would 
have to increase. 
Casting doubt on such arguments, however, existing 
research indicates that PF loans perform 
substantially better than corporate loans, and default 
rates and recovery rates are not necessarily 
correlated. Using a sample of 759 loans, Standard & 
Poor’s (2004) found that the loss given default 
(LGD) of PF loans is quite low (25% on average) 
and that, thanks to restructurings, 100% of loan 
values were maintained in their sample. Moreover, 
the study also reported that PF loans have better 
LGD rates than secured, senior, and senior 
unsecured corporate debt10. Notwithstanding, the 
New Capital Accord (Basel II) and even the Basel 
III Accord state that unless banks qualifies for the
internal rating based (IRB) approach, the capital 
reserve requirements for project loans must be 
increased, especially for transactions falling within 
the best rating classes.  
Considering the referred change in the regulatory 
environment, the development of methods for 
offsetting the impact of the New Capital Accord 
rules on PF loans has become a relevant issue. For 
example, until mid-2007, banks developed their 
capabilities to securitize PF loans issuing 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) or 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), thereby 
creating a new asset class for institutional 
investors11. Credit Suisse First Boston was the first 
institution to securitize the first portfolio of project 
loans in 1998, later followed by other banks. 
Sponsors benefit from securitization by gaining 
quicker access to funds, while banks benefit by 
increasing the speed of lending and useful 
instruments in order to comply with regulatory 
capital requirements and to increase funds available 
to finance infrastructure and development projects. 
Despite the referred benefits, there have been few 
securitized transactions as a result of insufficient 
data available for banks and rating agencies on loss 
characteristics12. Additionally, project loans 
securitization will remain difficult, and institutional 
investors are going to be reluctant to enter the 
market after the 2007/2008 financial turmoil. On the 
other hand, the issuance of PF straight bonds has 
increased significantly during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. 
4. Project finance: markets and deals 
This section provides a statistical analysis of PF 
lending worldwide. Our sample consists of 
individual loans extracted from Dealscan and covers 
the 2000-2014 period. Dealscan provides individual 
deal information on the global syndicated loan 
10 See also Beale t al. (2002) for an initial analysis of this subject. 
11 A CDO is a transaction, which involves repackaging the risk of a 
portfolio of financial assets. This risk is transferred to an SPV, either by 
transferring the portfolio to the SPV or using credit derivative 
techniques. The risk is, then, sold to the capital markets by way of the 
issuance of securities by the SPV, whereby investors in those securities 
bear the risk of losses suffered by the portfolio. 
12 Structuring these types of deals is more complex than traditional 
CDOs. Buscaino et al. (2012) point out four main reasons: (i) in 
traditional CDOs, the assets included in the pool are usually more 
homogeneous than in project CDOs; (ii ) reaching an appropriate size 
for the pool of assets is not as easy as for traditional CDOs; (iii ) the 
intrinsic complexity of PF transactions; and (iv) the definition of credit 
events for the PF loans can be problematic, given the different nature of 
the projects in the pool. 
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markets. Information is available on the micro 
characteristics of the loans (e.g., deal and loan 
size, maturity, currency, pricing, rating, type of 
interest rate) and of the borrowers (e.g., name, 
nationality, industry sector). Although the 
database extracted from Dealscan contains 
detailed historical information about syndicated 
loans and related banking instruments, we have 
excluded deals with no loan (facility) amount or 
deal amount available. These screens have 
yielded a sample of 5,935 PF deals (10,950 PF 
loans), worth $2,108.8 billion. This sample 
represents almost 90% of the PF syndicated lending 
between 2000 and 2014 – according to Thomson 
Reuters, global syndicated lending reached 
$48,082.8 billion during this period. 
The PF deal samples are described in Tables 1 to 
3. The distribution by year of deals is described in 
Table 1. Table 2 presents the industrial 
distribution of the PF sample, while Table 3 
presents the geographic distribution of PF 
syndicated loans. Table 1 shows that PF lending 
peaked in 2008 (by value and number), fell in 
2009 and rose again in 2010 and 2011. In 2014, a 
record $259.9 billion in PF funding was globally 
arranged, a 278.5% increase from the $68.7 
billion reported for 2000. Table 1 also shows that 
PF has not significantly contracted during the 
2007-2008 financial crises. 
Table 2 shows that PF lending is concentrated in 
five key industries, i.e., Utilities (29.8%), 
Construction (13.7%), Manufacturing (12.6%), 
Mining (10.7%) and Transportation (10.7%) 
account for 77.3% of all PF lending (value) and 
71.0% of all PF deals. Similar results are 
presented by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). 
Based on a sample of 4,956 PF loans booked on 
national and international markets from January 
1, 1980 through to March 23, 1999, they find that 
no less than 90.9% of all PF lending (by value) 
are made to borrowers in the Commercial & 
Industrial, Utilities, and Transportation industries. 
Corielli et al. (2010) present similar results. 
Based on a sample of PF loans closed between 
January 1998 and May 2003 they show that the 
largest share of loans was awarded to 
electricity/power and other energy utilities (about 
52% of the total value), followed by 
telecommunications (28%) and transportation 
(14%). This finding is consistent with the 
common understanding that PF is used primarily 
to fund tangible-asset-rich and capital intensive 
projects. 
Table 1. Distribution of the sample of PF  
deals by year 
Year 
Project finance loans 
Number of deals 
Total value 
[$US million] 
Percent of total 
value 
2000 271 68,667.7 3.3% 
2001 255 58,547.0 2.8% 
2002 232 48,319.1 2.3% 
2003 224 63,.925.8 3.0% 
2004 234 58,874.0 2.8% 
2005 222 76,319.5 3.6% 
2006 211 100,783.7 4.8% 
2007 332 153,311.5 7.3% 
2008 535 214,201.1 10.2% 
2009 468 166,510.3 7.9% 
2010 597 203,789.6 9.7% 
2011 609 218,654.2 10.4% 
2012 537 195,.142.7 9.3% 
2013 588 221,861.1 10.5% 
2014 620 259,904.4 12.3% 
Total 5,935 2,108,811.8 100.0% 
Notes: Table describes the distribution of the sample of PF 
deals by year. The first column details the number of deals per 
year, while the second column describes the total value in $US 
million. The third column presents percentages of the total 
value per year. 













3,262 1,160,300.4 55.0% 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
658 186,313.6 8.8% 
Mining 444 224,853.6 10.7% 
Construction 727 284,453.4 13.5% 
Manufacturing 621 265,798.9 12.6% 
Wholesale trade 51 10,055.6 0.5% 
Retail trade 21 3,000.1 0.1% 
Real estate 346 75,200.1 3.6% 
Services 394 110,625.1 5.2% 
Utilities 1,999 627,932.4 29.8% 
Financial services 52 19,532.8 0.9% 
Transportation 422 226,142.4 10.7% 
Public administrations/ 
government 
198 74,508.3 3.5% 
Other 2 395.6 0.0% 
Total 5,935 2,108,811.8 100.0% 
Notes: Table describes the industrial distribution of the sample 
of PF deals over the 2000-2014 period. The first column details 
the number of each type of deal allocated to borrowers in a 
particular industry, while the second column describes the total 
value (in $US million) of deals for each industry. The third 
column presents percentages of the total value for each 
industry. 
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Table 3 also shows clear differences between the 
countries which attract PF lending. The biggest 
recipients of PF lending are Western Europe and 
Eastern Asia. These regions account for 23.4% and 
18.4% of the total value and no less than 29.1% and 
15.3% of the total number of deals of PF loans, 
respectively, whereas only 10.4% of PF lending and 
only 12.0% of PF deals go to U.S. borrowers. The 
relevance of PF lending in Western Europe reflects 
two major trends. First, the emphasis placed by UK 
governments on the Private Finance Initiative, i.e., on 
private rather than public financing of large public 
infrastructure projects. The UK was the first country 
to launch a systematic program of such projects, based 
on a strategic economic policy to migrate public 
administration from owning assets and infrastructures 
to purchasing services from private parties instead. 
Second, PF, especially public-private partnerships, 
played an important role in reducing the need for 
government borrowing and shifting project risks to the 
private sector in Southern European countries. 
Through PPP structures, governments shift 
construction and operating risks to the private sector, 
which is usually more efficient in building and 
running the asset, and obtains both private-sector 
funding and private-sector management. As a whole, 
more than 50% of PF lending goes to non-OECD 
countries, which is consistent with the idea that PF is 
an appropriate method of funding projects in relatively 
risky countries.  
Table 3. Geographic distribution of the sample 




Project finance loans 
Number of deals 
Total value 
[$US million] 
Percent of total 
value 
Europe 1,993 586,979.2 27.8% 
Western 
Europe 
1,727 493,711.2 23.4% 
UK 323 111,332.6 5.3% 
Eastern 
Europe 
266 93,268.0 4.4% 
North America 878 271,109.7 12.9% 
US 712 220,239.3 10.4% 
Asia 2,316 978,331.1 46.4% 
Western Asia 366 259,608.5 12.3% 
Eastern Asia 908 387,183.4 18.4% 
China 357 250,610.7 11.9% 
Africa 175 71,811.3 3.4% 
Australia and 
Pacific 
234 82,559.8 3.9% 
Caribbean 22 9,495.6 0.5% 
Latin America 317 108,525.1 5.1% 
Total 5,935 2,108,811.8 100.0% 
Notes: Table describes the geographic distribution of the sample of 
PF deals over the 2000-2014 period. The first column details the 
number of each type of deal allocated to borrowers in a particular 
region (or country), while the second column describes the total 
value (in $US million) of deals for each region. The third column 
presents percentages of the total value for each region. 
Table 4 presents basic contractual characteristics for 
he sample of PF loans. Considering that Carey and 
Nini (2007) suggest that the corporate syndicated 
loan market is not globally integrated, offering 
evidence that spreads and pricing characteristics are 
different in Europe and the U.S., we also created 
two sub-samples of PF loans considering whether 
loans are extended to borrowers in the U.S. or W.E. 
The main goal is to examine if loans arranged in the 
U.S. vis-à-vis W.E. are significantly different 
financial instruments. 
Spread represents the spread paid by the borrower 
over Libor plus the facility fee (all-in-spread-
drawn). The mean (median) spread for the 
worldwide sample of PF loans is 224 bps (188 bps). 
Comparing the two sub-samples, mean spread is 
lower for PF loans extended to borrowers located 
in W.E. (174.9 bps) than for PF loans arranged 
for U.S. borrowers (249.5 bps). This result is in 
line with those of Carey and Nini (2007), who 
offer evidence that spreads on syndicated loans 
are, on average, 30 bps smaller in Europe than in 
the U.S. 
Country rating is approximated by Standard & 
Poor’s country credit rating at the time of closing 
the loans. This variable measures from 1 for the 
countries with the lowest risk (AAA = 1) to 22 for 
the countries of highest risk (D = 22). PF loans 
average country rating is 4.2, which is equivalent 
to an AA credit rating. As expected, country 
rating is higher for the W.E. sub-sample when 
compared with the U.S. sub-sample. This 
difference was magnified during the European 
sovereign debt crisis, since rating agencies 
downgraded sovereign ratings from several Western 
European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
While PF deal size does not differ significantly 
when comparing deals arranged for U.S. versus 
W.E. borrowers, PF loans extended to U.S. 
borrowers exhibit higher mean loan size ($176.3 
million) than loans extended to borrowers located in 
W.E. ($135.6 million). For the full sample of PF 
loans, the average loan size to deal size ratio is 
54.2%. Additionally, the loan size to deal size ratio 
is economically and statistically lower for PF loans 
arranged for W.E. borrowers (47.7%) than for 
loans arranged for borrowers located in the U.S. 
(57.5%). This result can be explained by the fact 
that W.E. transactions typically include a large  
number of tranches than U.S. deals; an average PF 
deal closed in W.E. includes 2.1 tranches, while 
average U.S. deals have 1.8 tranches. Thus, we can 
conclude that PF transactions in W.E. benefit more 
from tranching. 
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An average PF loan matures over 11.4 years. An 
interesting result is that a loan belonging to a W.E. 
deal has an average maturity of 13.2 years, which is 
twice more than that of a loan in the U.S. sub- ample 
(6.8 years). The average number of participating banks 
in a deal arranged for U.S. borrowers is 5.6, which is 
significantly larger than the 4.7 average numbers of 
banks in a W.E. deal. This is consistent with the view 
that banks in the U.S. attempt to maximize the number 
of PF participants to spread out risk. 
Table 4. Contractual characteristics of the sample of PF loans 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable of interest 
Project finance loans | Full sample Project finance loans | U.S. Project finance loans | W.E. 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
Spread [bps]1 3,510 224.0 188.0 705 249.5 230.0 1,212 174.9 140.0*** 
Country rating [1-22 weak]2 9,160 4.2 3.0 1,240 1.0 1.0 3,511 2.3 1.0*** 
Deal size 5,935 355.3 153.9 712 309.3 140.0 1,727 285.9 133.7 
Loan size 10,950 192.1 74.7 1,240 176.3 70.0 3,612 135.6 51.5*** 
Loan size to deal size 10,950 54.2% 50.0% 1,240 57.5% 64.5% 3,612 47.7% 38.7%*** 
Number of tranches 5,935 1.9 1.0 712 1.8 1.0 1,727 2.1 2.0*** 
Maturity [years] 9,851 11.4 10.0 1,097 6.8 6.0 3,213 13.2 14.0*** 
Number of banks 10,865 5.2 3.0 1,236 5.6 4.0 3,584 4.7 3.0*** 
Number of covenants 297 1.7 1.0 75 2.1 2.0 24 1.5 1.5** 
Upfront fee [bps] 1,003 82.1 60.0 103 126.4 100.0 226 66.1 47.5*** 
Panel B: Discrete variables 
Variable of interest 
Project finance loans | Full sample Project finance loans | U.S. Project finance loans | W.E. 
Number % of total Nr. (D = 1) Number % of total Nr. (D = 1) Number % of total Nr. (D = 1) 
Loans to financial institutions 10,950 0.8% 90 1,240 0.3% 4 3,612 0.7% 27 
Term loans 10,950 92.4% 10,114 1,240 82.7% 1,025 3,612 91.7% 3,314*** 
Loans with currency risk 10,950 30.0% 3,283 1,240 3.6% 45 3,612 11.2% 406*** 
Loans with fixed rate 4,267 25.8% 1,103 831 5.9% 49 1,261 2.2% 28*** 
Notes: Table 4 presents contractual characteristics for a sample of 5,935 PF deals (10,050 PF loans), plus two sub-samples created 
according to whether loans are arranged for U.S. borrowers – 712 PF deals (1,240 loans) or W.E. borrowers – 1,727 PF deals (3,612 
PF loans). In this table, we require that both loan amount and deal amount be available. We test for similar distributions in contract 
characteristics using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for continuous variables (Panel A) and the Chi-square test for discrete ones (Panel B). 
1The spread is the spread paid by the borrower over Libor plus the facility fee (all-in-spread-drawn). 2Country risk is the S&P’s 
country credit rating at closing date; the rating is converted as follows: AAA  = Aaa = 1, AA+ = Aa1 = 2, and so on until D = 22. 
***, **, and * indicates significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, r spectively, between the sub-samples. 
The variable number of covenants uffers from a 
missing value problem (an empty cell may mean that 
the loan has no covenats or that the data are 
unavailable). We, thus, report it simply as the number 
of covenants for loans in which the loan agreement 
legally imposes any of the standard positive or 
negative covenants on the borrower. As expected, the 
average number of covenants in a PF loan arranged 
for a W.E. borrower (1.5) is significantly smaller than 
in a loan extended to U.S. borrowers (2.1). The type of 
legal system – common law in the U.S. and UK versus 
civil law in Continental Europe – can explain this, 
since civil law legal systems provide stronger creditor 
rights to lenders. In PF transactions, lenders rely upon 
the network of nonfinancial contracts as a 
mechanism to control agency costs and project risks 
(Corielli et al., 2010) and loan covenants are 
designed to protect the creditor mainly for asset 
substitution and other procedures of wealth 
expropriation by the borrower. 
The observed level of upfront fees for the full 
sample is 82.1 bps. The mean levels of upfront fees 
for loans extended to U.S. borrowers (126.4 bps) 
are significantly higher than the levels for W.E. 
loans (66.1 bps). This finding coupled with the fact 
that U.S. borrowers face higher spreads suggest that 
the total cost of borrowing in PF deals closed in the 
U.S. is significantly higher than that faced by W.E. 
borrowers. 
5.9% of our U.S. loans sub-sample has fixed rates 
compared with only 2.2% of W.E. loans sub-
sample, which means that in W.E., PF loans are 
more frequently closed with floating rates. Currency 
risk – a loan has currency risk if the denomination 
of the loan differs from the currency of the 
borrower’s home country – varies significantly 
between loans extended to U.S. borrowers and loans 
extended to borrowers located in W.E. Loans in 
U.S. deals are less likely to bear currency risk 
(3.6%) than loans closed to W.E. borrowers 
(11.2%). Given the non-U.S. nature of typical PF 
borrowers, coupled with the fact that syndicated 
loans are frequently dollar-denominated, this high 
level of currency risk is not surprising. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between PF 
loans and other types of financing transactions (e.g., 
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asset securitization or corporate bonds) is how 
infrequently PF loans are extended to financial 
institutions (only 0.8%). This makes sense, as banks 
are primarily lenders rather than sponsors in the PF 
market. 
In short, our results indicate that the common 
pricing characteristics differ significantly in value 
between PF loans extended to U.S. versus W.E. 
borrowers. Our results are generally in line with those 
presented by Carey and Nini (2007). Additionally, our 
univariate analyses confirm that PF transactions are 
most commonly used for capital-intensive facilities 
and utilities with relatively transparent cash flows, in 
riskier than average countries, using relatively long-
term financing.  
Conclusion 
Project finance (PF) is a form of financing based on 
a standalone entity created by the sponsors, with 
highly levered capital structures and concentrated 
equity and debt ownership. Being a nexus of 
contracts, it is also used to segregat  the credit risk 
of the project from those of its sponsors so that 
lenders, investors, and other parties will appraise 
the project strictly on its own economic merits. The 
allocation of specific project risks to those parties 
best able to manage them is one of the key 
comparative advantages of PF. 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the main 
contract characteristics of PF transactions and 
presents a comparative analysis between loans 
extended to U.S. borrowers with those arranged for 
borrowers located in W.E. Using a sample of 5,935 
PF deals (10,950 PF loans) closed between 2000 
and 2014, we find that PF lending increased 278.5% 
between 2000 ($68.7 billion) and 2014 ($259.9 
billion). Our results show that PF lending is highly 
industry concentrated, with commercial & industrial, 
utilities, and transportation industries concentrating 
more than 70% of the total PF syndicated debt. We 
also conclude that the biggest recipients of PF 
lending are Western Europe (23.4%) and Eastern 
Asia (18.4%), whereas only 10.4% of PF lending 
goes to U.S. borrowers. The relevance of PF lending 
in Western Europe reflects, firstly, the emphasis 
placed by UK governments on the Private Finance 
Initiative and, secondly, the role played by Public- 
 
Private Partnerships in reducing the need for 
government borrowing and shifting project risks to 
the private sector in Southern European countries. In 
short, our results show that PF transactions are most 
commonly used for capital-intensive facilities and 
utilities with relatively transparent cash flows, in 
riskier than average countries, using relatively long-
term financing.  
Univariate analysis shows that the common pricing 
characteristics differ significantly in value between  
PF loans extended to U.S. versus W.E. borrowers: 
loans extended to U.S. borrowers have a higher total 
cost of borrowing (spread and upfront fees) and 
have higher loan size to deal size ratios than loans 
arranged for borrowers located in W.E. On the 
contrary, loans closed in the U.S. have much shorter 
average maturity and are much less likely to be 
subject to currency risk and to be closed as term 
loans. The significant difference in contractual 
characteristics between the U.S. and W.E. sub-
samples might be explained by differences in the 
type of financial system: market-based financial 
system in the U.S. and bank-based financial system 
in continental Europe. According to Foley and 
Greenwood (2010), shareholder protection and 
financial market development have been shown to 
influence the relative costs of different types of 
external financing and may, therefore, similarly 
affect the cost and the contractual characteristics of 
loans used in PF. The same idea is presented by 
Allen and Gale (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(1999), and Chakraborty and Ray (2006), who argue 
that the way an economy mobilizes resources for 
investment, selecting investment projects to be funded, 
and providing incentives for the monitoring of the 
performance of the funded investments depends on the 
type of the financial system. Investigating the factors 
that can explain these differences is an important 
avenue for further research. 
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